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ABSTRACT: Flood insurance helps to cope with the risk of flooding, but take-up rates are 
relatively low. Insurance density could rise if index-based insurance (IBI) were provided as an 
alternative to traditional damage-based insurance (DBI). We analyze whether there is 
potential for private demand for IBI in Germany. We use data from a discrete choice 
experiment combined with damage data for a major flood in 2013. We find IBI to attract 
similar customers as DBI, while DBI is preferred on average. Our results suggest that not 
many new customers would enter the market, once IBI were available. (JEL Q54, R22) 
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Floods pose a major natural hazard to economic development and human well-being, in 
developing as well as high-income countries (Ciscar et al. 2011). Moreover, climate change is 
expected to induce an increase in severity and frequency of flood events (Hirabayashi et al. 
2013; IPCC 2012). Against this background, flood insurance plays an important role in 
coping with floods, mitigation of damage, and pricing of risks. Climate change will only 
increase the relevance of viable insurance markets. However, take-up rates for private flood 
insurance are remarkably low (Schwarze et al. 2011). Even if premiums are subsidized, 
demand often stays behind expectations (Kunreuther 1984). As high insurance levels are 
generally desired by policy makers, governments try to foster private demand by various 
instruments, such as public insurance programs (e.g. in the US), publicly financed re-
insurance (e.g. in France), or risk awareness campaigns (e.g. in Germany). Despite these 
efforts, in insurance markets without an obligation to insure flood risks the take-up rates 
remain relatively low. In Germany, market penetration of flood insurance is as low as 38%, 
albeit increasing in the last years (GDV 2015). 
In developing countries, index-based insurance (IBI) has been seen as a promising 
opportunity to enhance private demand for insurance (Skees 2008) and thereby foster 
adaptation to climate change (Collier et al. 2009). In the case of IBI, payments of the insurer 
are bound to one or several previously determined weather indices which correlate with 
damage, e.g. the amount of precipitation at a specific location. Major advantages relative to 
damage-based insurance (DBI) are lower administrative costs (typically individual damage 
assessments are not needed) and the absence of moral hazard. However, IBI bears the risk that 
the actual damage of an insured is not fully covered (this risk is referred to as “base risk”). 
Although there is substantial experience and research with IBI in developing countries, it is 
not clear yet whether such insurance could also enhance insurance demand in a high-income 
country context. This is exactly the topic of this paper. We analyze the demand for 
conventional (damage-based) and index-based flood insurance in the case of Germany using 
data from a discrete choice experiment (DCE). We identify factors that influence the choice 
between damage-based, index-based, and no flood insurance. In particular, by exploring the 
take-up potential of index-based flood insurance we provide the first empirical results on its 
attractiveness in a high-income country. 
The advantages of IBI relative to DBI are most relevant in developing countries. In particular, 
on-site damage assessments are often complex and costly in remote, rural areas. With IBI, 
individual damage assessments become obsolete and administrative costs of the insurance 
may fall substantially. In some cases, IBI may permit retailing insurance policies where it was 
not possible with conventional, damages-based policies. This is different in high-income 
countries. Individual damage assessments are easier and flood insurance markets are typically 
well developed. But there is a number of arguments why IBI, especially index-based flood 
insurance, may become more important even in richer countries. 
First, given a low insurance penetration of less than 40%, insurance companies may see the 
opportunity to gain new clients by offering a new, possibly cheaper product type based on 
weather indices. Especially in a highly competitive insurance market like Germany, the 
potential of reaching new clients may trigger the interest and efforts of insurance companies 
in developing an IBI. Furthermore, moral hazard is often seen as a problem for flood 
insurance as policy holders have some possibilities to influence their own risk ex ante (Skees 
and Barnett 1999). With IBI, insurance coverage does not reduce the incentives to mitigate 
flood risk – hence there is no risk of moral hazard. Also, policymakers have an interest that 
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more households insure themselves and may see IBI as an additional instrument to reach 
higher take-up rates. This finds expression in the EU’s green paper on insurance (European 
Commission 2013, p.10), which says that “(IBI) can improve affordability of insurance by 
reducing administrative costs, because it does not include a claims adjustment process. It also 
speeds up pay-outs, and can be associated with simpler insurance contracts.” 
Second, there is already a small, but increasing market of various IBI for consumers also in 
high-income countries. In Germany, clients can insure against rainy weather during their 
summer holiday or when visiting outdoor fun parks. Businesses, e.g. outdoor caterer or event 
manager, can insure against income losses due to bad weather. These policies are partly seen 
as oddities so far, but may get more relevant in future.  
Finally, in high-income countries accurate and reliable weather observations are typically well 
available – this is a precondition for the functioning of IBI schemes. Regarding flood 
insurance, possible indices may include precipitation which is observed via radar systems and 
weather stations. The extent of river flooding can be assessed by automatic gauges and 
satellites. In Germany, which we take as a case study, all these weather observation systems 
are well available and provide a spatially and temporally detailed and accurate picture of 
hydrological events such as floods. Moreover, high-income countries are typically in the 
position to provide long term and reliable weather data, which would be needed for setting the 
parameters of an IBI scheme. In this context, the German Insurance Association (GDV) 
recently started a research project on the correlation of heavy rain and insured damage in the 
2000s (GDV 2015). Potentially, the results may be used for parametrizing an index-based 
flood insurance and assessing the base risk which stays with the insured household. 
Hence, we see very good technical and scientific preconditions for IBI schemes in high-
income countries like Germany. At the same time, policymakers on the national and European 
level have expressed their objective of fostering private flood insurance demand. With the 
potential to gain new clients in a highly competitive market while avoiding the moral hazard 
problem, we conclude that index-based flood insurance may be developed and marketed also 
in high-income countries in future. Our research enables first insights into the extent and 
determinants of demand for this innovative product.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In lack of existing literature on the 
demand for index-based flood insurance in high-income countries, we review two related 
literature strands in Section 2: empirical studies focusing on demand for IBI in developing 
countries, and those analyzing conventional flood insurance markets in high-income 
countries. In Section 3, we describe the data, the experimental design, and the econometric 
approach used in our analysis. The empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 4. 
The final section summarizes and concludes. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, we first review the empirical literature on IBI demand in developing countries. 
For high-income countries, there is almost no empirical evidence. However, in order to relate 
our results to the existing literature, we will summarize the main determinants of conventional 
flood insurance demand in Germany and other high-income countries in the second part of 
this section. 
There is a growing literature body on the determinants of IBI in developing countries (see 
Miranda and Farrin [2012] for a literature review on case studies throughout the world). So 
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far, all implemented or hypothetical insurance schemes which were analyzed empirically 
provide coverage of agricultural or pastoral production. Hill et al. (2013) use Ethiopian rural 
household survey data and show that educated, wealthy, and risk-seeking households are 
more likely to purchase IBI. These results are broadly confirmed by Bogale (2015) who finds 
additional negative effects of the availability of non-farm income and remittances. Giné et al. 
(2008) report similar results for smallholder farmers in rural India. Alongside household and 
farm characteristics, results of Cole et al. (2014) suggest that experience in the village may 
play a major role. By using panel data of seven years in an Indian context, they find that the 
probability to purchase index-based crop insurance increases with previous payouts within the 
same village. The authors conclude that information about insurance payouts have village-
wide demand effects. Regarding the role of product comprehension, Takahashi et al. (2016) 
come to the conclusion that improved knowledge about IBI per se does not necessarily 
increase demand. However, they find strong evidence for price effects in their data from 
Ethiopia. Finally, gender differences in the demand for IBI are analyzed by Akter et al. 
(2016). The results from a DCE in coastal Bangladesh suggest that women are less willing to 
use insurance services, which cannot be fully explained by differences in risk and time 
preferences. Instead, farmers’ level of trust in the insurance industry and financial literacy are 
suggested as the main determinants of gender differences in the preferences for IBI. 
For index-based agricultural insurance demand in high-income countries, there is very limited 
evidence. In a DCE on government intervention in agricultural insurance markets in Finland, 
Liesivaara and Myyrä (2014) postulate a higher willingness-to-pay for index-based contracts 
than for comparable conventional insurance policies. Being a by-product in their paper, the 
authors do not further discuss this result. To the best of our knowledge, there is no single 
study on the demand for IBI covering private homes or contents. However, we can draw on a 
large and growing number of empirical studies on demand for conventional (damage–based) 
flood insurance in high-income countries. Most of these studies use household survey data to 
assess the demand for insurance coverage. Exceptions are Browne et al. (2015), who exploit 
customer data of a large insurance company in Germany, and Browne and Hoyt (2000) and 
Kriesel and Landry (2004), who analyze the extent of flood insurance demand on a larger 
regional level (states or communities, respectively). In terms of methodology, Botzen and van 
den Bergh (2012) and Brouwer and Schaafsma (2012) are very close to our approach. Both 
studies employ DCEs in order to assess the demand for an insurance product which is not 
available in the market. Both focus on insurance demand in the Netherlands. For Germany, 
flood insurance demand has been analyzed in a small number of studies (Browne et al. 2015; 
Bubeck et al. 2013; Raschky et al. 2013). The remaining literature on flood insurance demand 
covers countries like the USA (Landry and Jahan-Parvar 2011; Lindell and Hwang 2008; 
Petrolia et al. 2013), the Netherlands (Terpstra and Lindell 2012), and the UK (Bichard and 
Kazmierczak 2012). Most of these studies show that the attractiveness of flood insurance 
correlates positively with income, the value of the home, household size, perceived flood risk, 
and prior damage experience. Throughout all studies, demand correlates negatively with 
insurance premiums, often with a lower sensitivity for higher income households. Further 
control variables (e.g. gender, age, level of education) show mixed or non-significant 
correlations with insurance demand. 
Our contribution to the existing literature is the following: We provide novel empirical 
evidence on the demand for index-based insurance outside the agriculture and livestock sector 
and in a high-income country context. Furthermore, we compare preferences for conventional 




3. DATA AND METHODS 
3.1 Data and Experimental Design 
We use data from a DCE in which respondents could choose between damage-based and 
index-based flood insurance, and no flood insurance. The DCE was part of a larger survey of 
German homeowners conducted in June and July 2014 by forsa, a professional market 
research company.1 Some 4,000 homeowners were sampled from forsa’s master household 
sample, which is nationally representative of household size and regional distribution. The 
questionnaire was accessible online and via the TV screen at home. Respondents were queried 
about their beliefs, experiences, perceptions, and attitudes on various issues related to extreme 
weather events and climate change adaptation. During the survey period no natural disaster 
occurred in Germany or was prevalent in the media. The most recent major flood in Germany 
occurred in June 2013, one year before the survey, which may have had an effect on flood risk 
perception, especially in the affected regions (e.g., Atreya et al. 2013; Kousky 2010). In order 
to be able to control for the effects of the 2013 flood on insurance demand, we merge the 
survey data with data on flood insurance claims provided by the GDV. 
From the sampled homeowners, 3,465 live in a detached house or use ground floors or 
basements and are thus potentially interested in insuring their property against floods. Since 
respondents were expected to be unfamiliar with index-based insurance, they were informed 
about its characteristics prior to the DCE. A concise paragraph explained that the insurer’s 
payment is then based on a predetermined weather index, such as rainfall or water level, and 
independent from the actual damage, emphasizing that in some cases the payment may be 
higher than the damage while in others lower. This paragraph was followed by the question 
whether the respondent would generally consider such an index-based flood insurance, if 
available. Only those who did not categorically rule out IBI at this stage (35%) were 
presented with the DCE. This was done because of our concern that people who are 
unresponsive to index-based insurance might not seriously participate in the DCE, leading to 
biased coefficient estimates. Therefore, the final sample of this study consists of 1,161 
homeowners.2 
We kept the experimental design very simple. The DCE involved two labelled insurance 
alternatives, one damage-based and one index-based, both described by only one attribute, the 
insurance premium. Respondents were instructed to consider the alternatives to be identical in 
all other respects (e.g., insurance company, sales channel) and asked to select the most 
preferred one. In order to enhance the realism of the choice setting (Carson et al., 1994), 
respondents also had the option to opt out by choosing no flood insurance at zero costs. 
Figure 1 shows an example of a choice set (translated from German). 
                                                     
1 For more information on the survey, including the questionnaire (in German language), see Osberghaus (2015). 
2 Differences between the original and final sample are presented in Section 4. Note that 46 respondents who did 
not rule out IBI abandoned the survey before answering the DCE. 
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Figure 1: Example choice set 
Which policy would you prefer for insuring your home against flood damage? 
Type of insurance 
Normal insurance, i.e. 
payout depends on 
damage 
Weather-based insurance, 
i.e. payout depends on 
weather 
No flood insurance 
Premium 40 Euros per year 
70 
Euros per year 
0 
Euro 
My choice O O O 
 
For the insurance premium, we used three attribute levels when designing the choice sets: 
low, medium, and high. When answering the choice sets, respondents saw premium levels in 
euro-per-year terms, which were customized based on the respondent’s perceived flood risk at 
home. The perceived flood risk was queried earlier in the questionnaire using the four risk 
categories used by the GDV. Table 1 shows these risk categories, the share of respondents, 
and the related premium levels. The selected attribute levels reflect current prices for flood 
insurance and the fact that premiums increase with risk. They were drawn from Stiftung 
Warentest, the leading German consumer organization, and FinanceScout24, a price-
comparison website for financial products. By customizing the insurance premium that way, 
we enhance the relevance of the attribute levels (Hensher et al., 2005) and make the choice 
sets more realistic. 
Table 1: Flood risk categories and premium levels in the discrete choice experiment 
  Premium level (€/year) 
Flood risk (statistical recurrence interval of flooding) Resp. (%) Low Medium High 
At least once every 10 years 16.9 400 1,200 2,400 
Once every 10 to 50 years 18.4 80 200 400 
Once every 50 to 200 years 16.3 40 70 120 
More rarely than once every 200 years 34.1 20 50 80 
Don’t know 14.3 40 70 120 
 
Given two labelled alternatives and one three-level attribute, there are only nine (3(2x1)) 
possible choice sets. However, we further reduced this number to six by dropping those 
choice sets where the two insurance alternatives are equally priced, while keeping the design 
orthogonal and level balanced. In the DCE, each respondent faced these same six choice sets, 
but in randomized order and, as mentioned above, with customized premium levels. 
Before answering the series of choice tasks, respondents were provided with a set of 
instructions. First, we have to consider that we do not know the real status quo of their 
insurance coverage.3 Hence, respondents were asked to answer as if they have no flood 
insurance on their home yet. Therefore, whenever respondents opt out and choose no flood 
insurance, we do not have to worry about anyone interpreting this option as falling back to 
any own insurance cover, for which we lack credible information. Second, respondents were 
reminded of their self-reported perceived flood risk and asked to consider this risk level in 
their choice. Respondents who answered “don’t know” to the risk question were told to 
                                                     
3 Although the homeowners reported their flood insurance coverage, the answers showed that many participants 
were uncertain. Comparisons with insurance penetration data of the GDV suggest that many homeowners may 
overestimate their own insurance coverage (Osberghaus 2015). 
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consider a flood risk of once every 50 to 200 years. Third, respondents were asked to assume 
that the thresholds of rainfall and water level used for the index-based alternative are chosen 
such that, on average, its insurance payments equal that of the damage-based alternative 
(though it can be lower or higher than the actual damage in a specific case). And finally, they 
were told to assume that rainfall and water level can be measured accurately and reliably for 
their property, for example by satellite technology. 
3.2 Econometric Modelling 
We assume a random utility framework to analyze the choice data, as is typically done in 
DCE studies. In this framework, the utility 𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 provided by alternative 𝑗𝑗 to person 𝑛𝑛 in 
choice situation 𝑡𝑡 is assumed to be 
𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 +  𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 
where 𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑉𝑉(𝐱𝐱𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛) is a deterministic (observed) utility component, depending on 
attributes of the alternative and characteristics of the person 𝐱𝐱𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, and 𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 is a (unobserved) 
stochastic component. According to the economic theory of utility-maximising behaviour, 
person 𝑛𝑛 chooses that alternative from the alternative set {1, … , 𝐽𝐽} which provides him with 
the greatest utility. Since utility is modeled as a random variable, however, only choice 
probabilities can be estimated. Depending on the assumptions made about the distribution of 
the random variables 𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (𝑛𝑛 = 1, … ,𝑁𝑁;  𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽;  𝑡𝑡 = 1, … ,𝑇𝑇), different classes of discrete 
choice models can be defined. 
In this paper, we use both standard multinomial logit (MNL) and mixed logit (MXL) models 
for the analysis. In MNL models, the 𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 are independent and identically distributed (iid) 
with type 1 extreme value distribution. As we further assume 𝑉𝑉 to be linear in unknown 
parameters 𝛃𝛃, the probability that person 𝑛𝑛 chooses alternative 𝑖𝑖 in choice situation 𝑡𝑡 takes the 
following closed form (e.g., Train 2009): 
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = exp(𝛃𝛃′𝐱𝐱𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)
∑ exp(𝛃𝛃′𝐱𝐱𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)𝐽𝐽𝑛𝑛=1  
In our case, there are three alternatives per choice set (𝐽𝐽 = 3): a damage-based flood insurance 
(𝑗𝑗 = 1), an index-based flood insurance (𝑗𝑗 = 2), and no flood insurance (𝑗𝑗 = 3). The no 
insurance alternative is used as the base alternative, its deterministic utility 𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛3𝑛𝑛 is therefore 
normalized to zero.  
In the MXL specification, we include an additional error component 𝜂𝜂𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, where 𝜂𝜂𝑛𝑛 is a 
normally distributed random term with zero mean, and 𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 a dummy variable that identifies 
the two flood insurance alternatives (i.e. 𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1 if 𝑗𝑗 < 3; 0 otherwise). Thereby, we allow 
the two insurance types to be correlated in unobserved factors. This relaxes the well-known 
IIA assumption of standard logit, and thus might represent a more realistic substitution 
pattern, in particular in the presence of the no insurance alternative (e.g., Scarpa et al. 2005; 
Hess and Rose 2009). In addition, we specify the insurance premium coefficient 𝛼𝛼 to be 
lognormally distributed. This allows for unobserved heterogeneity in price sensitivity while 
ensuring the behaviourally plausible coefficient sign and finite moments for willingness-to-
pay estimates (e.g., Daly et al. 2012). To account for repeated choices by the same person, we 
hold these two random terms constant over choice situations. The probability for a sequence 
of choices 𝗶𝗶 = (𝑖𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇) can then be written as the double integral of a product of standard 
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logit probabilities over all values of 𝛼𝛼 and 𝜂𝜂, weighted by the (normal) density 𝑓𝑓 of ln(𝛼𝛼) and 
the (normal) density 𝑔𝑔 of 𝜂𝜂 (e.g., Train 2009), i.e. 
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝗶𝗶 = ��� exp�𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛 + 𝛃𝛃′𝐱𝐱𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛 + 𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛�
∑ exp�𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝛃𝛃′𝐱𝐱𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�𝐽𝐽𝑛𝑛=1𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛=1 𝑓𝑓(ln(𝛼𝛼)|𝜇𝜇𝛼𝛼,𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼)𝑔𝑔�𝜂𝜂�0,𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂� 𝑑𝑑𝛼𝛼 𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂 
where 𝛃𝛃, 𝜇𝜇𝛼𝛼,𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼 and 𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂 are the parameters to be estimated. As this double integral cannot be 
solved analytically, it has to be approximated through simulation during the estimation 
process. We use Halton draws with 2,500 replications for the maximum simulated likelihood 
estimation. 
Table 2 describes the variables used in the econometric analysis. We regress the choice 
outcome on insurance premium, type of insurance as well as individual and property 
characteristics. We include information on the respondent’s gender, age, education, risk 
attitude, and perceived flood risk as well as the household’s income. In addition, we control 
for the house value, implemented flood protection measures, and damage caused by the 2013 
flood in the respective county. Because the non-experimental variables do not vary over 
alternatives, they enter the choice models interacted with alternative-specific dummy 
variables for damage-based and index-based flood insurance. In this way, we can identify 
who is more likely to choose a particular insurance type.  
Table 2: Variables and summary statistics 
Variable name Definition Mean SD Min. Max. Obs. 
Insurance 1 if alternative is damage-based or index-
based insurance 
0.67 0.47 0 1 - 
Insurance premium Annual insurance premium in €1,000 0.20 0.49 0 2.40 - 
Woman 1 if respondent is female  0.30 0.46 0 1 1,161 
Age Respondent’s age in years 56.09 11.60 20 85 1,160 
University 1 if respondent received a university 
degree 
0.31 0.46 0 1 1,146 
Income Household’s monthly net income in 
€1,000 (midpoints of 12 income 
categories) 
3.32 1.33 0.25 5.75 991 
Risk attitude Self-reported risk attitude on a scale from 
0 (not at all risk taking) to 10 (very risk 
taking) 
4.82 2.00 0 10 1,161 
House value Self-reported new construction value of 
the property in €100,000 
2.86 4.37 0.10 120 847 
Flood protection 1 if respondent implemented flood 
protection measures to his/her home 
0.53 0.50 0 1 1,071 
Flood of 2013 Share of flood insurance claims at county 
level during the 2013 flood in per cent 
0.89 1.63 0.04 12.52 1,161 
Flood risk > 10 years 1 if respondent perceives a flood risk of 
at least once every 10 years 
0.17 0.37 0 1 1,161 
Flood risk 10-50 years 1 if respondent perceives a flood risk of 
once every 10 to 50 years 
0.18 0.39 0 1 1,161 
Flood risk 50-200 
years 
1 if respondent perceives a flood risk of 
once every 50 to 200 years 
0.16 0.37 0 1 1,161 
Don’t know flood risk 1 if respondent answered “don’t know” 
to the flood risk question a 
0.14 0.35 0 1 1,161 
a Those respondents who answered “don’t know” to the flood risk question were told to consider a flood risk of 
once every 50 to 200 years when answering the DCE. 
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The insurance premium enables us to measure differences in utility between the insurance 
alternatives in monetary terms. The extra premium that keeps utility constant when switching 
from alternative 𝑗𝑗 to alternative 𝑖𝑖 is given by the following ratio: 
𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = −𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛 − 𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛
𝛼𝛼
 
Since 𝛼𝛼 is lognormally distributed and the numerator is constant, 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 also follows a 
lognormal distribution. If 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 is positive, it can be interpreted as the willingness to pay 
(WTP) for switching from 𝑗𝑗 to 𝑖𝑖, otherwise as the compensation that leaves the insured not 
worse off. 
4. RESULTS 
There is widespread skepticism in our sample about the benefits of IBI.4 Almost two-thirds of 
homeowners stated that they would not consider IBI to protect their property, even if it were 
cheaper than a conventional DBI. The remaining would possibly consider it (22%) or were 
undecided (13%). Recall that only the latter two groups of respondents, those who did not 
categorically rule out the IBI option, were presented with the DCE. Contingency table and 
simple logit regression analysis reveals that those perceiving higher flood risks and having 
implemented flood protection measures are more likely to judge IBI favorably. We find that 
women tend to be more undecided. But there are no significant differences in terms of age, 
education, income, risk attitudes, or actual insurance coverage between the sceptics and the 
rest. Detailed results for this analysis are not reported here but are available upon request. 
In the DCE, with varying insurance premiums, the IBI alternative was chosen in 22% of the 
cases, DBI in 42%, and no flood insurance in 36%. Interestingly, 23% of the chosen IBI 
alternatives were more expensive than their DBI counterparts. We are interested in identifying 
the factors that influence homeowners to choose one flood insurance over another. Therefore, 
as mentioned above, we regress the choice outcome on insurance premium, type of insurance, 
and individual-specific factors, using MNL and MXL model specifications. The next section 
presents and discusses the parameter estimates. 
4.1 Parameter Estimates 
Table 3 shows the results of our multivariate regression analysis of the choice data. The first 
two columns give the estimates of the MNL model that provides a useful starting point for our 
empirical analysis. Let us look at the two main findings that emerge from MNL, and which 
are consistent with those from MXL. 
                                                     
4 In the remainder of the paper, the abbreviations IBI and DBI refer specifically to index-based flood insurance 
and damage-based flood insurance, respectively. 
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Table 3: Multinomial and mixed logit models of flood insurance choices 
 MNL MXL 
 Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Insurance premium -1.158*** 0.084 1.834*** 0.136 
Damage-based     
Woman 0.422*** 0.091 1.537* 0.792 
Age -0.004 0.004 -0.082** 0.032 
University -0.250*** 0.085 -0.387 0.747 
Income 0.067** 0.031 0.206 0.277 
Risk attitude 0.061*** 0.019 0.147 0.174 
House value 0.029 0.020 0.137 0.303 
Flood protection 0.380*** 0.076 1.491** 0.689 
Flood of 2013 0.038 0.024 0.240 0.241 
Flood risk > 10 years 1.874*** 0.146 6.488*** 1.074 
Flood risk 10-50 years 1.546*** 0.114 8.229*** 1.081 
Flood risk 50-200 years 1.194*** 0.112 6.306*** 1.017 
Don’t know flood risk 0.986*** 0.125 5.434*** 1.269 
ASC -0.837*** 0.246 3.500 2.216 
Index-based     
Woman 0.380*** 0.103 1.490* 0.790 
Age -0.009** 0.004 -0.086*** 0.032 
University -0.094 0.097 -0.220 0.744 
Income 0.024 0.036 0.176 0.276 
Risk attitude 0.087*** 0.022 0.176 0.174 
House value 0.033 0.020 0.145 0.303 
Flood protection 0.401*** 0.088 1.524** 0.687 
Flood of 2013 0.087*** 0.026 0.303 0.241 
Flood risk > 10 years 2.171*** 0.149 6.804*** 1.073 
Flood risk 10-50 years 1.613*** 0.128 8.018*** 1.075 
Flood risk 50-200 years 1.320*** 0.127 6.386*** 1.014 
Don’t know flood risk 0.568*** 0.158 4.809*** 1.261 
ASC -1.287*** 0.281 2.836 2.207 
S.D. of random parameter     
Insurance premium   2.454*** 0.117 
S.D. of error component     
Insurance   6.088*** 0.486 
Individuals 732  732  
Observed choices 4,392  4,392  
Log likelihood -4361.9  -2963.2  
AIC 8777.7  5984.4  
Pseudo R2 0.096  0.386  
Notes: Column 3 gives the estimated mean (𝜇𝜇) and standard deviation (𝜎𝜎) of the log of the insurance premium 
coefficient (with the negative of insurance premium entering the MXL model); the median, mean, and standard 
deviation of the coefficient itself can be computed by exp (𝜇𝜇), exp (𝜇𝜇 + 𝜎𝜎2/2), and exp (𝜇𝜇 + 𝜎𝜎2/2) ×
�exp(𝜎𝜎2) − 1, respectively (Hole 2007). Triple, double, and single asterisks denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
First, we find the insurance premium and the self-perceived flood risk to be the two most 
important factors in choosing a flood insurance, regardless of the type. Higher premiums 
make flood insurance less attractive, higher flood risks make them more attractive, as 
expected. This is consistent with results from previous studies (e.g., Kunreuther 1996; 
Browne and Hoyt 2000; Botzen and van den Bergh 2012; Brouwer and Schaafsma 2013). For 
each flood risk category (see Table 1), a single dummy variable is included in the model, with 
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the lowest risk – a recurrence interval of at least 200 years – serving as the omitted category. 
All these risk dummies enter positively and significantly; the point estimates of their 
coefficients even increase monotonically with perceived flood risk (which is not quite the 
case in the MXL model). With a further dummy, we separately identify respondents who 
answered “don’t know” to the flood risk question. Those were asked to consider a flood risk 
of once every 50 to 200 years when answering the DCE. The estimated coefficients for the 
“don’t know” variables are positive and significant, too, but lower than the other ones, 
suggesting that perceived risks influence choices stronger than assumed risks. 
Second, we find the alternative-specific coefficient estimates to be equal in sign and very 
similar in magnitude for DBI and IBI. We include a number of covariates that are invariant 
across alternatives, such as age, income, or house value, to control for observed heterogeneity 
of preferences. Some of them appear to influence choices, some do not, as we will discuss 
later. However, the impact of most of these variables does not significantly differ between the 
two types of insurance policies. So these variables affect, if at all, the choice of any flood 
insurance over the non-option, but not so much the choice between DBI and IBI. Statistically 
significant differences between DBI and IBI can be observed only in terms of experiences 
with Germany’s 2013 flood, the highest flood risk level (i.e., recurrence interval of 10 years 
or less), and to a lesser extent education.5 Homeowners living in 2013 flood-hit counties or 
who perceive an extremely high level of flood risk tend to prefer IBI over DBI (Wald tests: 
p=0.027 and p=0.028, respectively). This suggests that once people see themselves confronted 
with the threat of flooding, be it implied or expressed, the simpler and less bureaucratic IBI 
becomes more attractive. It is possible that some of these homeowners or their neighbors 
experienced flood damage in the past and were dissatisfied with the performance of their 
insurer, and therefore prefer IBI. It is also possible, however, that IBI is perceived as a way to 
profit from future flood events in these high-risk areas. Whenever one’s own damage is 
expected to be smaller than payouts, IBI is a good choice. Lastly, individuals with a university 
degree seem to be more reluctant to take up damage-based flood insurance, but not so much 
index-based ones (Wald test: p=0.082). 
Let us now turn to the estimated MXL model shown in the last two columns of Table 3. The 
MXL model clearly outperforms the MNL model. Allowing for random price sensitivity as 
well as correlation in unobserved factors and over time improves the model fit considerably 
(likelihood ratio test: p=0.000). 
The error component itself enters the choice model highly significantly, indicating correlation 
in the unobserved portion of utility between the two insurance alternatives. This leads to 
increased substitution between DBI and IBI. In other words, a cheaper IBI would attract 
disproportionately more homeowners who previously have selected the damage-based 
alternative than those who have opted for no flood insurance at all, and vice versa. This 
possibility was ruled out in the MNL specification. 
Likewise, the standard deviation of the log of the random insurance premium coefficient is 
highly significant. This indicates strong heterogeneity in price sensitivity among homeowners, 
which was not accounted for in the MNL model. The positive sign of the mean estimate of the 
log of the insurance premium coefficient does not mean that homeowners prefer higher 
premiums, the opposite is true. Because the natural logarithm is defined only for positive 
                                                     
5 There is also a statistically significant difference for respondents who did not know how to rate their property’s 
flood risk, preferring DBI over IBI. Possibly, those who are too “lazy” to think about probabilities of flood 
events also tend to be unwilling to consider and become familiar with the unfamiliar insurance alternative, but 
this is only speculation. 
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numbers and insurance premium is expected to have a negative coefficient, we follow the 
standard procedure and let the negative of insurance premium enter the MXL model (e.g., 
Hensher and Greene 2003; Hole 2007; Train 2009). A positive coefficient of negative 
premiums implies that utility decreases with increasing premiums. 
Otherwise, the MXL model basically confirms the results of the MNL model, although the 
magnitude of the estimated coefficients increases and the significance level of some of them 
changes. The former effect is simply due to the different scale of utility, as now some of the 
variance in the unobserved factors is captured by the additional random terms instead of the 
iid 𝜀𝜀, whose normalization determines the scale (Brownstone and Train 1999). 
In contrast to findings from the Netherlands (Botzen and van den Bergh 2012), we find 
women to be more likely to select a flood insurance policy. The age coefficients for both 
flood insurance types are negative and significant. On average, older homeowners are 
wealthier, more likely to have paid off their mortgage, and less likely to experience a flood in 
their remaining lifetime. All of these factors might make them less concerned about possible 
flood damage and might explain our finding. The effect of income and house value on 
insurance demand is positive but not significant. Somewhat counterintuitively, the risk 
attitude variables have positive coefficients. Although the estimates lose their significance in 
the MXL model, the positive signs are robust to alternative specifications that we have tried. 
One explanation could be that risk-taking people tend to buy homes at higher flood risk, and 
that the risk characteristics of the property site are not fully captured by the other covariates. 
On the other hand, it is possible that our relatively simple measure for risk attitude is too 
imprecise to reflect the different types of risk-taking behavior documented in the literature 
(Bruhin et al. 2010; Petrolia et al. 2013). Homeowners who have implemented measures to 
protect their property from flooding and to limit the damage are more likely to select a flood 
insurance. Flood protection measures we observed include backflow traps, water-repellent 
rendering, water-resistant floors such as stone and tiles, but also non-technical measures such 
as moving valuable furnishings to the upper floors. Thus, we find no evidence for adverse 
selection in the sense that, conditional on having the same level of flood risk, the more 
vulnerable and unprepared have a higher demand for flood insurance. Rather, it seems that 
(arguably risk-averse) homeowners regard flood protection and insurance as complements. 
Our finding on private flood protection seems consistent with the empirical evidence on 
community- or state-level flood protection (Kriesel and Landry 2004; Botzen and van den 
Bergh 2012), although its effect on insurance demand varies across the types of measures 
(Landry and Jahan-Parvar 2011), across regions (Petrolia et al. 2013), and is sometimes an 
artefact of country-specific market conditions (Bubeck et al. 2013). 
Remember that the effect of all these variables does not vary significantly between DBI and 
IBI. This shows that IBI attracts similar customers as DBI. Nevertheless, we find strong 
evidence that homeowners, on average, prefer DBI to IBI. This is indicated by the significant 
difference between the two alternative-specific constants (ASCs), which capture the average 
effects of omitted factors on utility (Wald test: p=0.041). In the next section, we will quantify 
the difference in utility between DBI and IBI in monetary terms. 
4.2 Willingness to Pay 
Based on the MXL model, we derive the WTP for having one’s property flood insured with a 
DBI instead of an IBI. The WTP is the difference in premiums between DBI and IBI that 
keeps utility constant when changing the type of insurance. It is the extra premium people 
would pay to avoid the base risk inherent to IBI. As described in Section 3.2, the WTP 
follows a lognormal distribution. Lognormal distributions, however, can be highly skewed 
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with a long right-hand tail, resulting in unreasonable mean estimates for WTP (Hensher and 
Greene 2003). We will therefore refer to the more robust median WTP in the following. 
To illustrate the effect of selected variables, we estimate the WTP under different scenarios. 
In one set of scenarios, we assume the lowest level of flood risk (less frequently than once 
every 200 years), while in a second set, the highest level (once every 10 years). Within these 
two sets, we let the county’s share of flood insurance claims for the flood of 2013 vary from 0 
to 4%. The variables whose coefficients do not vary significantly between DBI and IBI are set 
to their means (continuous) or modes (dummy), except for the university variable. Since the 
university coefficients vary nearly significantly between DBI and IBI in the MXL model (and 
weakly significantly in MNL), we estimate the WTP for homeowners with and without 
university degree. 
Table 4 presents the median WTP estimates and their 95% confidence intervals, calculated 
using the delta method (see e.g., Oehlert 1992; Bliemer and Rose 2013). For the first scenario, 
with the lowest flood risk, no university degree, and no flood insurance claims, the WTP for 
DBI is the highest. The point estimate is €133, with a confidence interval of €83 to €182. In 
other words, under this scenario, the monthly premium of an IBI would need to undercut the 
DBI premium by €11 to make the insurances equally attractive. As soon as we move to 
counties that were more affected by the 2013 flood, the WTP for DBI decreases considerably. 
Likewise, a homeowner who graduated from university, or who perceives his or her home to 
be located in the highest flood-risk area, has a lower WTP for DBI. If these factors are 
combined, there are even cases where the WTP for DBI is not statistically significant 
anymore. For example, under the highest risk scenarios, in a county where 4% of flood-
insured homes filed insurance claims, the confidence intervals include zero. And the higher 
the county’s share of insurance claims, the more competitive IBI would be in that market. 
Table 4: Willingness-to-pay estimates for switching from index-based to damage-based flood insurance under 
different scenarios 
Scenario Median WTP (€/year) 
Flood risk University Flood 2013 Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
< 200 years No 0% 132.8 83.3 182.2 
< 200 years No 2% 112.7 66.5 158.8 
< 200 years No 4% 92.5 43.7 141.4 
< 200 years Yes 0% 106.1 57.5 154.7 
< 200 years Yes 2% 86.0 40.7 131.4 
< 200 years Yes 4% 65.9 17.7 114.1 
> 10 years No 0% 82.4 34.3 130.4 
> 10 years No 2% 62.3 16.5 108.0 
> 10 years No 4% 42.2 -7.3 91.6 
> 10 years Yes 0% 55.7 3.8 107.6 
> 10 years Yes 2% 35.6 -14.2 85.4 
> 10 years Yes 4% 15.5 -37.8 68.8 
Notes: The WTP values are estimated by assuming men (woman = 0), mean values for age (56 years), income 
(€3,300), risk attitude (4.8), and house value (€290,000), some sort of flood protection implemented (flood 
protection = 1) and perceived flood risk was given (don’t know flood risk = 0). 
However, counties with higher shares of insurance claims are the exception rather than the 
rule. According to the GDV data, the maximum share for the 2013 flood is 12.5%. But the 
mean share is smaller than 1%, and in some 95% of the counties, 4% or less of the flood-
insured filed claims. Moreover, only 1-2% of German homes are exposed to the highest level 
of flood risk. Therefore, our WTP estimates under the most conservative assumptions, that is 
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the lowest flood risk and share of insurance claims, are a useful benchmark for the relative 
superiority of DBI over IBI. 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Flooding is a severe natural hazard, and its relevance will probably increase due to climate 
change in the future. In order to cushion financial losses of flood events and to generally 
enhance resilience against floods, policymakers in many countries try to foster private flood 
insurance demand. Despite those efforts, voluntary insurance demand stays relatively weak. 
In this regard, IBI may help. In the case of IBI, the payments are bound to previously 
determined weather indices or parameters, e.g. precipitation at the location of the insured. It is 
expected that IBI policies may be offered at lower premiums than comparable conventional 
insurance policies. In this case IBI could be a new option for homeowners who are currently 
declining the more costly conventional insurance.  
In this paper, we have analyzed the demand for IBI in Germany. Our results reveal a 
considerable skepticism about this alternative type of insurance. Almost two thirds of the 
sampled homeowners have ruled out IBI as an option to insure their property against floods, 
regardless of its price and other terms and conditions. In a DCE, a sample of more than 1,000 
homeowners who have not categorically ruled out IBI beforehand chose their preferred 
insurance policy. Besides a conventional (damage-based) policy and an index-based policy, 
participants could also opt for a no-insurance option. Controlling for many observable 
characteristics and allowing for correlation in unobserved factors, our econometric results 
confirm that, on average, German homeowners prefer DBI over IBI. Based on our preferred 
model, we have derived a benchmark estimate for a reduction in monthly premiums of €11 
that will offset the drawback of an IBI policy and result in equal choice probabilities. 
We have also examined potential differences in the determinants of demand for the two types 
of flood insurance. Significant differences would indicate that IBI has the potential to reach 
new customer segments. However, the determinants of insurance demand turn out to be very 
similar for DBI and IBI. We find only significant differences in terms of perceived flood risk 
and flood experience. Those who live in areas of the highest flood risk, both subjectively and 
objectively measured, seem to derive a greater utility from IBI than others. 
Being the first empirical insight in IBI demand in a high-income country, these results suggest 
a sobering conclusion regarding the success probabilities of that novel instrument. At least in 
Germany, where our empirical study was carried out, private homeowners as potential clients 
are very reluctant to index-based insurance products. However, as flood insurance markets are 
characterized by strong national peculiarities (Schwarze et al. 2011), further research may 
approach the question in other countries. Similarly, the picture could change if one focuses on 
specific customer segments, such as large enterprises or public actors who need to insure 
large infrastructure assets. Given the relatively higher attractiveness of IBI in flood-
experienced and flood-prone areas, its role may also be strengthened if climate change 
induces a considerable upwards trend of flood risks. But in general, the potential of index-
based insurance solutions for increasing resilience against natural hazards in high-income 
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